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REALITY OR ILLUSION? THE EFFICACY OF NONMARKET STRATEGY IN 
INSTITUTIONAL RISK REDUCTION 
Abstract 
Nonmarket strategy researchers have postulated that political and social strategies reduce the 
exposure of firms to risk, but those arguments have received little empirical attention. In this 
paper, we integrate social capital and institutional theories to examine the efficacy of 
managerial political ties (MPT) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) in institutional risk 
reduction. Using survey data from 179 firms in Ghana, we find that whereas CSR reduces 
institutional risk exposure, MPT do not. We also find that the effect of MPT on risk exposure 
is moderated by public affairs functions. Contrary to extant literature, we do not find 
evidence of complementarity between MPT and CSR. Altogether, the findings do not only 
show that the proposed efficacy of MPT in risk reduction is illusive, but they also signal the 
need for scrutinizing the harmony between nonmarket political and social strategies. 
 
Keywords: 
Managerial political ties, corporate social responsibility, institutional risk exposure, emerging 
countries 
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Introduction 
There is growing research on the link between nonmarket strategy and organizational 
outcomes. Nonmarket strategy, which is defined as “a firm’s concerted pattern of actions to 
improve its performance by managing the institutional or societal context of economic 
competition” (Mellahi et al., 2016: 143), has two key components: corporate political activity 
(CPA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR). Nonmarket scholars suggest that advancing 
our understanding of the link between nonmarket strategy and organizational outcomes 
requires the integration of both CPA and CSR (Hond, et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015; 
Darendeli and Hill, 2015). However, the combinative impact of engagement in CPA and CSR 
has not been examined to any great extent. 
Though recent studies have shown the importance of integrating nonmarket social and 
political strategies (Mellahi et al., 2016), many of these studies are conceptual (e.g. Hond et 
al., 2014; Rehbein and Schuler, 2015). The few that are empirical have focused on developed 
countries (e.g. Hadani and Coombes, 2015; Werner, 2015). Building on Puck, Rogers, and 
Mohr (2013), Liedong et al., (2015) and Mellahi et al., (2016), we expand integrated 
nonmarket strategy research to emerging countries by addressing the following research 
questions: (1) what is the impact of managerial political ties (MPT) and CSR on institutional 
risk exposure; and (2) do Public Affairs (PA) functions help to reduce institutional risk 
exposure? Our study examines the singular and combined effects of MPT and CSR on 
institutional risk exposure, as well as the moderating effect of PA functions on MPT and CSR 
in Ghana
1
. 
                                                          
1
 Based on previous research (Peng & Luo, 2000; White, Boddewyn, & Galang, 2015), we define managerial political ties as 
the extent to which firms’ managers establish and maintain informal relationships via personal networks with government 
officials, and CSR as corporate actions that improve social welfare (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; McWilliams, Siegel & 
Wright, 2006). We also define institutional risk exposure as the sum of investment climate constraints resulting from weak 
market supporting institutions. This risk is more prevalent in emerging countries where political, economic and legal 
institutions are insufficiently developed (Schwens, Eiche, & Kabst, 2011). 
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We draw upon and integrate social capital theory and institutional theory to achieve 
our goal. Precisely, we rely on the micro-macro link of social capital theory (Peng and Luo, 
2000; Acquaah, 2007) to argue that in emerging countries where market institutions are 
weak, the micro ties senior managers establish with influential politicians can enable their 
organizations to gain access to private information, influence government policy, and reduce 
exposure to institutional risk (Acquaah, 2007; Luo, 2001; Luo and Zhao, 2013; Peng and 
Luo, 2000). This argument is based on the new institutional economics perspective (North, 
1990; Williamson, 2000) which emphasizes the effect of political governance on institutional 
structures (Doh, Lawton and Rajwani, 2012) and the strong link between political or 
regulatory uncertainty and nonmarket strategy (Kingsley, Vanden Bergh, and Bonardi, 2012; 
White et al., 2015). It is strengthened by the fact that political stakeholder management in 
emerging countries revolves around social ties and networks (Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; 
Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).  
With respect to CSR and PA functions, we draw upon the legitimacy-based logic of 
institutional theory to argue that corporate responsibility and community initiatives enhance 
corporate reputation (Hond et al., 2014), strengthen trust between firms and institutional 
actors (Liedong et al., 2015) and confer legitimacy on firms (Park, Lee and Kim, 2014; 
Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016). Legitimacy, which is about the adaptation of nonmarket 
initiatives to suit local institutional contexts (Mellahi et al., 2016), is particularly more 
important in emerging countries (Guo, Xu, and Jacobs, 2014) where weak institutional 
conditions put pressure on firms to ensure that their actions are desirable or appropriate 
within systems of norms and values established by institutional actors (Suchman, 1995; 
Zheng, Luo, and Maksimov, 2015). Similarly, weak institutional conditions in emerging 
countries make structural management of external affairs crucial (Greening and Gray, 1994), 
hence the need for PA functions. These functions are important links between firms and their 
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external environments (Griffin and Dunn, 2004), and they are useful for managing 
institutional stakeholders who are reportedly the source of legitimacy (Chiu and Sharfman, 
2011). We posit that legitimacy can lead to desirable organizational outcomes such as 
regulatory leniency (Hong and Liskovich, 2015) and risk reduction (Bansal and Roth, 2000; 
Luo, 2001; Henisz and Zelner, 2005; Stevens, Xie and Peng, 2016). Indeed, the results of this 
study show that CSR and PA functions significantly reduce risk exposure. However and 
contrary to expectations, the results also show that the main effect of MPT and the combined 
effect of MPT and CSR are insignificant.  
Our study contributes to nonmarket strategy literature in three ways. First, it sheds 
light on the interactive effect of MPT and CSR and thus addresses the paucity of empirical 
research on integrated nonmarket strategy. It is worth noting that MPT and CSR have been 
studied, but in silos, and hence little is known about their combined effect on organizational 
outcomes (Mellahi et al., 2016; Lin et al., 2015; Sun, Mellahi and Wright, 2012; Frynas and 
Stephens, 2015).  
Second, in addition to addressing the lack of research on the combinative effects of 
nonmarket initiatives, this study examines the role of PA – a function that supports CSR and 
MPT – but has largely been overlooked in extant studies. PA, CPA and CSR are different, but 
their difference is rarely articulated in nonmarket strategy research. We note that risk 
reduction requires firms to structurally manage their relationships with institutional actors 
(Kotter, 1979). However, organizational structures which support firms’ political activities or 
strengthen legitimacy-building CSR initiatives have received little attention in nonmarket 
strategy research (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012), a shortcoming addressed in this study.  
Third, this study examines an immediate outcome of nonmarket strategy – 
institutional risk exposure - and thus departs from the trajectory of studying outcomes that are 
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difficult to attribute to nonmarket strategies. Reviews of the literature reveal that the 
performance outcomes that are often investigated are distant from the direct influence of 
MPT or CSR, and this distance perhaps underlies the limited ability of nonmarket researchers 
to provide plausible explanations for the causal mechanisms of their findings (Puck et al., 
2013), as the linkages may be improbable or unconvincing. Consequently, the lack of 
credible treatise of mediation curtails a deeper understanding of nonmarket strategy (Guo et 
al., 2014; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Our focus on institutional risk is both interesting and 
important because of the negative effect of institutional voids on firm survival and 
performance in emerging countries, especially in Africa. One of the greatest challenges for 
private sector development in Africa stems from disabling investment climates and non-
supporting institutional infrastructure. Firms on this continent are exposed to voids 
manifested by high levels of corruption and weak market supporting institutions which 
increase the cost of doing business (Khanna, Palepu, and Sinha, 2005; Acquaah, 2007; Puck 
et al., 2013). Set in the weak institutional environment of Ghana, this study examines a 
context-relevant outcome and addresses the paucity of studies on issues that remain major 
concerns for firms in Africa and other emerging continents (George et al., 2016). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next sections, we introduce our 
theoretical framework, review related literature and develop the hypotheses. We also present 
the sources of data and describe our methodology. Thereafter, we report the results and 
discuss their implications for theory and practice. We conclude by outlining the limitations of 
the study and suggesting directions for further research. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Organizational theorists have argued that managerial actions are embedded in networking 
relationships (Granovetter, 1973; Granovetter, 1985). These relationships create social 
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capital, a valuable resource for firms. The central proposition of social capital theory suggests 
that networking relationships have a significant positive impact not only on individuals, but 
also on firms. In this respect, there are two main perspectives for examining the effect of 
social capital: the micro-micro link and micro-macro-link. While the micro-micro-link 
focuses on the impact of networking ties on managers and employees, the micro-macro link 
focuses on the effect of managerial ties on organizations (Gulati, 1995; Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal, 1998; Peng and Luo, 2000).  
Building on the micro-macro link, management researchers have argued that the 
social capital of managers improves firm performance and reduces uncertainty by creating 
access to the polity and lessening information asymmetry (Peng and Luo, 2000; Acquaah, 
2007). A popular argument in social capital studies suggests that networking relationships are 
more important and prevalent in emerging countries (Peng and Luo) where they serve as 
substitutes for weak market supporting institutions (Xin and Pearce, 1996). 
Also important in emerging countries is institutional legitimacy (Ahlstrom, Bruton 
and Yeh, 2008). Legitimacy is gained when firms align their behaviours with their 
institutional environment (Suchman, 1995; Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Research shows 
that CSR improves legitimacy (Scherer, Palazzo and Seidl, 2013; Zheng et al., 2015; Hadani 
and Coombes, 2015; Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016) which culminates in reduced risk 
exposure (Bansal and Roth, 2000; Luo, 2001; Stevens et al., 2016) and enhanced 
organizational performance (Mellahi et al., 2016). In Ghana and other emerging countries, 
CSR initiatives such as philanthropy are positively interpreted, hence firms that give back to 
society are widely respected, admired and tolerated (Ofori and Hinson, 2007). Moreover, 
CSR signals that a firm is well governed and well behaved in society (Hond et al., 2014). 
These positive views of CSR are expected to discourage public officials from subjecting 
responsible firms to administrative obstacles stemming from demands for informal payments, 
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discrimination and bureaucratic red tape. Recent evidence that regulators are lenient with 
socially responsible firms (Hong and Liskovich, 2015) supports this claim. As the 
mechanisms of MPT and CSR are dissimilar, our study integrates social capital and 
institutional theories to explore institutional risk exposure in Ghana, an emerging African 
country.  
Firms operating in emerging countries have a high exposure to uncertainty. Miller 
(1992) proposed five types of uncertainty. They include: 1) political uncertainty arising from 
regime changes; 2) government policy instability; 3) macroeconomic uncertainty; 4) social 
uncertainties; and 5) natural uncertainties. The first four types of uncertainty, together, 
underscore institutional risk. Government policies such as nationalization or expropriation; 
trade protection; earnings repatriation restrictions; import, export and currency restrictions; 
and capital controls have been established as common sources of risk. Risks increase 
economic and transaction costs (North, 1990; Williamson, 1991), endanger survival, reduce 
competitiveness, and consequently affect performance (Hillman and Hitt, 1999). Hence, it is 
imperative for firms to manage their exposure to risk by behaving responsibly (Doh et al., 
2012; Shiu and Yang, 2015) or by developing ties to politicians (Hillman et al., 1999).  
While the conceived efficacy of nonmarket strategies in risk reduction is common in 
the literature, empirical proof is lacking; there is a paucity of research on this very important 
topic. The study that is most related to ours was conducted by Puck and colleagues (2013) 
who did not find empirical evidence to support the proposition that political strategies reduce 
risk exposure. Building on Puck et al. (2013), our study extends the scope of nonmarket 
strategy by including the effects of CSR and PA functions to capture the multiplicity and 
heterogeneity as well as the interrelationship between political and social actors in business 
environments.  Figure 1 shows our overall research model. 
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---------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
                                         ---------------------------------- 
Managerial Political Ties and Institutional Risk 
Firms and governments exhibit a typical principal-agent relationship whereby the former are 
principals and the latter are agents (Getz, 1997). This relationship might be implicit and 
informal but as noted, not all principal-agent contracts are formalized (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Governments are expected to act in the best interest of their constituents (including 
firms), but this does not always happen due to various reasons, such as politicians’ lack of 
information about the consequences of policy (Lord, 1995). In emerging countries, firms face 
even greater institutional risks due to the volatility and fragility of the institutions in these 
countries (Luo, 2004). However, agency problems between firms and governments are 
manageable through political connections (Getz, 1997; Keim and Baysinger, 1993). For 
instance, Jayachandran (2006) argues that firms target their contributions towards politicians 
whose interests are aligned with theirs. This ensures that elected politicians invariably pursue 
the interests of supportive firms. Therefore, politically connected firms can get policy favours 
which help to reduce their risk exposure.   
The ability of firms to use political connections to shape government policies or 
influence legislations (Liebman and Reynolds, 2006; Steagall and Jennings, 1996) empowers 
them to take control of their environments. Through political ties, firms get to know the 
intentions of policymakers (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). They gain access to information that 
is costly or difficult to obtain and are able to block the passage or implementation of 
detrimental policies (Doh et al., 2012). The consequent reduction of information asymmetry 
lessens the risks to which they are exposed.  
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Moreover, the high propensity for governments to bail out politically connected firms 
(Blau, Brough, and Thomas, 2013; Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006) serves as an 
implicit guarantee of protection from shocks or voids in the environment. Politically 
connected firms may perform poorly but as they get support from the government, their 
probability of bankruptcy is low (Kostovetsky, 2015). Consequently, connected firms 
perceive a low exposure to risk due to receiving political protection. In emerging countries 
where the number or power of independent veto players (Henisz, 2004; Henisz and Delios, 
2004) is typically low, the “rules of the game” are unclear, and legal frameworks are 
premature (Li, 2005; White et al., 2015), politicians can speed up slow bureaucratic processes 
and clear up major institutional obstacles that affect firms. We therefore hypothesize that: 
H1: In an emerging country, managerial political ties reduce institutional risk 
exposure.  
Corporate Social Responsibility and Institutional Risk 
Firms can use CSR to influence their policy environments (Sun et al., 2012; Mellahi et al., 
2016). Within the last decade, political CSR – which refers to CSR with intended or 
unintended political impact (Frynas and Stephens, 2015) - has received significant attention 
from management scholars (Palazzo and Scherer, 2011; Newell and Frynas, 2007). Beyond 
providing basic infrastructure for communities, filling development gaps in emerging 
countries and contributing to national and global regulation (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; 
Margolis and Walsh, 2003), CSR increases reputation and enables firms to develop 
trustworthy relationships with community actors and politicians (Liedong et al., 2015). This 
resultant trust improves legitimacy (Hadani and Coombes, 2015), increases public goodwill, 
and reduces the exposure of firms to government intervention (Stevens et al., 2016) and other 
negative institutional effects (Luo, 2001; Henisz and Zelner, 2005) such as extortions, 
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bribery, discrimination, or community revolts. We posit that positive public perceptions and 
legitimacy of socially responsible firms will cause public officials to exercise leniency in the 
application of regulations to these firms (Hong and Liskovich, 2015), speed up administrative 
processes and refrain from demanding bribes. 
 CSR is therefore expected to reduce risk, especially socially-driven risk. At worst, 
CSR will make managers feel insulated from institutional constraints due to the public 
goodwill associated with benevolent practices. In developing countries such as Ghana, public 
perceptions of firms are positively influenced by the level of support and moral obligations 
the firms have towards communities (Ofori and Hinson, 2007; Kuada and Hinson, 2012). At 
best, CSR will give managers the incentive to push institutional boundaries or the impetus to 
engage with relevant stakeholders to overcome institutional voids. Importantly, the chance of 
success in policy influence or risk reduction is higher for firms that are socially responsible 
(Hond et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015).   
H2: In an emerging country, corporate social responsibility reduces institutional risk 
exposure.  
The Complementarity of Corporate Social Responsibility and Political Ties 
CSR can strengthen the effectiveness of political ties in reducing risk exposure. Mellahi et al. 
(2016) advocated that alignment between political connections and CSR activities enhances 
organizational performance. Similarly, Sun et al. (2012) argued that CSR may amplify the 
positive effects of political ties. With this in mind, Mellahi et al. (2016) further suggested that 
doing CSR in emerging countries does not only strengthen a firm’s political connections and 
subsequently enhance its performance, but it may also serve as a buffer to the potentially 
risky effects of political connections.   
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Insights from institutional legitimacy are particularly useful for articulating the 
complementarity of MPT and CSR. In emerging economies, a firm’s engagement in CSR 
activities signals its health and indicates its willingness to address social problems. Recent 
research on the link between CSR and CPA suggests that doing CSR helps firms to gain 
political legitimacy, which increases their chances of getting government support (Lin et al. 
2015). Legitimacy also increases the reputation and visibility of managers and helps them to 
further strengthen their social capital. Moreover, CSR complements MPT to develop strong 
trust which leads to effective policy influence. This is because MPTs alone are less trusted 
while CSR alone, through legitimacy, may create access to the polity but no influence 
(Liedong et al., 2015). However, when combined their synergy is greater. Furthermore, 
strong MPT may help firms legitimise and publicise their CSR activities (Mellahi et al., 
2016). For example, having a high profile politician open a CSR initiative is likely to attract 
media coverage, thereby increasing firms’ visibility and ratings by key stakeholders (Lawton, 
Doh, and Rajwani, 2014).   
It is worth noting that there are few legal obligations for firms to do CSR in emerging 
countries (Hamann et al., 2005). CSR in these countries is largely a moral choice for most 
firms (Kuada and Hinson, 2012). Therefore, socially responsible firms are perceived to be 
trustworthy (Hillenbrand, Money, and Ghobadian, 2013; Pivato, Misani, and Tencati, 2008), 
have large and strong constituencies and are less likely to face resentment (Liedong et al., 
2015). They are also more likely to be perceived as well governed due to their high visibility 
(Hond et al., 2014). The resultant institutional legitimacy and goodwill from CSR address the 
social roots of institutional risk. MPT may reduce political and policy uncertainties, but there 
could be instances when these uncertainties are initiated by the public or when corporate 
influence on policymaking is abhorred by society (Milyo, Primo, and Groseclose, 2000), 
especially in emerging countries where the dark side of political activity – corruption, 
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bribery, cronyism, etc. - is more likely to manifest (Lawton, McGuire, and Rajwani, 2013a). 
Strong public resentment reduces politicians’ discretion (Schuler, 2008) and renders MPT 
ineffective in institutional risk reduction. Therefore, we posit that combining CSR and MPT 
helps firms to develop trust and gain legitimacy with both political and social actors, expand 
their political capital and consequently reduce their risk exposure. 
H3: In an emerging country, higher levels of social responsibility strengthen the 
ability of managerial political ties to reduce institutional risk exposure. 
The Moderating Effect of Public Affairs Function 
PAs offer channels for interaction between firms and their external environments (Griffin and 
Dunn, 2004). PA, a broader nonmarket function that supports, deepens and highlights CSR 
and CPA, focuses on the creation and maintenance of a specific set of external stakeholder 
relationships (Lawton et al., 2014). A PA serves as a window in and a window out of the firm 
(Adams, 1976). As a window in, it increases visibility, transparency and trust between a firm 
and its stakeholders, and thus improves institutional legitimacy. As a window out, it shapes 
the opinions of public stakeholders (i.e. government, public agencies) and private 
stakeholders (i.e. interest groups, non-governmental organizations). In this respect, PA 
functions can have a significant impact on the ability of MPT and CSR (separate or 
combined) to reduce risk exposure.  
First, in emerging countries where institutions are still developing, the stakeholder 
environment is volatile and dynamic (Puck et al., 2013). Beside governments’ substantial 
impact on the business climate of these countries (Child and Tse, 2001), private stakeholders 
such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also wield significant influence. For 
instance, on one hand, NGOs help to fill development gaps and protect human rights (Dahan, 
Doh, Oetzel and Yaziji, 2010), thus contributing to a better socio-economic environment 
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within which firms can succeed. They may also serve as partners or collaborators for firms to 
overcome institutional constraints or implement adapted business models in developing 
markets (Boddewyn and Doh, 2011; Dahan et al., 2010; London and Hart, 2004; Oetzel and 
Doh, 2009). On the other hand, NGOs can instigate revolts and smear campaigns against 
firms (London and Hart, 2004), which can culminate in adverse policy actions and high 
exposure to institutional risk. The discussion above shows that private stakeholders have to 
be managed effectively in order to reduce risk in business environments, but they cannot be 
managed using political strategies. Rather, carefully planned PA programs which do not only 
keep private stakeholders informed but also offer opportunities for collaborative initiatives 
will best mitigate risks, create conducive business environments and confer external 
legitimacy on firms (Rondinelli and London, 2003). In other words, combining PA functions 
with MPT will ensure that public and private stakeholders are managed effectively to reduce 
risk exposure.  
Second, PA functions increase the visibility of firms to external stakeholders. This 
increased visibility does not only confer legitimacy on the firms, but it also enhances the 
recognition and reputation of affiliated managers and employees. Drawing on the notion that 
organizational visibility increases employees’ perceptions of self-worth (Fuller et al., 2006; 
Tyler, Degoey and Smith, 1996), we argue that managers will use the visibility, legitimacy 
and status of their firms to augment their self-esteem and boost their confidence to strengthen 
or expand their connections to the polity. PA-driven visibility and legitimacy will reinforce 
CPA, lead to stronger political ties and eventually result in a lower exposure to risk. 
Third, stakeholders are the providers of legitimacy (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011), but 
they cannot provide it if they are not aware or informed about the activities of firms. In 
essence, the ability of CSR to create corporate goodwill is lower when multiple stakeholders 
are unaware of firms’ CSR initiatives. Visibility is therefore an important element in 
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legitimacy creation, and it can be attained through PA functions. For instance, firms with 
high media coverage of their CSR programs experience greater scrutiny which helps to 
reduce information asymmetry between stakeholders and managers (Brammer and 
Millington, 2006), culminating in trust and legitimacy. Beside the role of PA functions in 
publicizing CSR for legitimacy-conferring outcomes such as risk reduction, the visibility 
derived from PA functions also heaps high expectations and pressure on firms (Meznar and 
Nigh, 2005) and makes them more socially responsive (Brammer and Millington, 2006; Chiu 
and Sharfman, 2011). With recent research demonstrating that NGOs have a considerable 
influence on corporate citizenship behaviour and CSR (Park and Ghauri, 2015), we contend 
that NGOs and other private stakeholders are drawn to firms that are highly visible through 
their PA activities. Consequently, PA functions will reinforce CSR to reduce institutional 
risk.  
Strategically, firms with PA functions formalize their interaction with the external 
environment. Such formalization leads to strategic planning, evaluation or support for 
nonmarket strategies. We argue that PAs strengthen nonmarket strategies by serving as 
conduits for scanning and monitoring political and social movements in weak institutional 
contexts. This monitoring enables firms to develop and implement appropriate approaches for 
strengthening social capital, enhancing institutional legitimacy and reducing risk exposure. 
Indeed, when firms are properly designed or structured, they are more effective in managing 
external dependency (Kotter, 1979) and risk exposure (Dieleman and Boddewyn, 2012). In 
emerging countries however, the importance of PA functions is yet to be recognized as most 
firms, especially the locally owned firms, are not strategically organized to address external 
affairs.  
In sum, the efficacy of nonmarket strategies is dependent on the formal organizational 
structures through which the strategies are implemented (Keim and Baysinger, 1988). In this 
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respect, PA functions represent formalization and institutionalization of nonmarket strategy. 
These functions increase the scope of stakeholder management beyond CPA alone or CSR 
alone, reinforce both CPA and CSR, increase corporate visibility and confer legitimacy on 
firms. We therefore posit that the legitimizing role of PA functions will strengthen the main 
and interactive effects of MPT and CSR on institutional risk exposure.  
H4a: In an emerging country, the presence of PA functions or departments in firms 
strengthens the ability of managerial political ties to reduce institutional risk exposure  
H4b: In an emerging country, the presence of PA functions or departments in firms 
strengthens the ability of corporate social responsibility to reduce institutional risk 
exposure 
H4c: In an emerging country, the interactive effect of political ties and social 
responsibility on institutional risk exposure is strengthened by the presence of PA 
functions or departments in firms 
Research Setting and Methodology 
This section presents the context of the study, the sources of data, techniques used to ensure 
reliability and validity of the findings, and a description of the variables and their measures.  
Research Setting 
There is inadequate strategy and management research on Africa (Hoskisson et al. 2000; 
Wright et al., 2005; Mellahi and Mol, 2015; Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015). Especially, there 
is a paucity of nonmarket strategy research on the continent. Emerging countries may share 
similar characteristics such as weak regulatory environments (Acquaah, 2007), but they may 
have unique institutional and social frameworks that differentiate them from one another. 
Consequently, it could be erroneous to generalize nonmarket strategy research findings from 
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China, Malaysia, Indonesia, or Thailand to every other emerging country. The African 
continent has interesting phenomena that have not yet been examined, and thus presents 
opportunities for researchers to explore empirical blind spots and contribute to theory 
(Klingebiel and Stadler, 2015).    
This study is set in Ghana in sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana is saddled with weak legal 
structures and pervasive corruption. Powers of the government are separated, but checks and 
balances are largely ineffective. Consequent of these institutional weaknesses, uncertainty is 
rife in the country. Institutional voids have not only worsened the country’s macroeconomic 
fundamentals, but they have also harmed private sector development. For instance, pervasive 
corruption and economic mismanagement have been cited among the reasons why public 
debt stock soared from GH¢ 9.5 billion to GH¢97.2 billion between 2008 and 2015, a figure 
representing 72.9% of GDP (Bank of Ghana, 2016). Also, unfavourable tax administration, 
bribery and corruption have discouraged entrepreneurs from participating in the formal sector 
(Koto, 2015). Precisely, informal firms dominate the private sector landscape in Ghana, 
employing 86.1% of the workforce in the country (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012). In light 
of the increased costs associated with institutional voids, formal entrepreneurship in Ghana 
has narrowly focused on high-rewarding industries such as mining, oil, energy and 
telecommunications.  With a weak institutional environment, Ghana is a suitable context for 
examining the association between nonmarket strategy and institutional risk exposure. 
Sampling and Data 
In emerging countries, archival data is rare (Wright et al., 2005). In Ghana particularly, 
archival data is limited or unavailable (Acquaah, 2007; Amoako-Gyampah and Boye, 2001). 
This is because most firms in the country are privately owned and do not provide information 
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to the public; only 37 firms were listed on the stock exchange at the time of this study. Hence 
we collected data using a survey, which we triangulated with secondary data where possible.  
We designed a questionnaire which was shared with peers to check whether the items 
were appropriate for the constructs we wanted to examine (Fowler, 1995). The questionnaire 
was then pilot tested with 20 managers in Ghana to examine the validity of the questions vis-
à-vis the Ghanaian environment (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 2008). As part of the pilot testing, 
face-to-face interviews were conducted with 10 managers to collect more information on 
content validity and appropriateness of the questions.  
Following previous studies, we sought to maximize the response rate through 
assurances of anonymity (Acquaah, 2007), offers to share results upon completion (Chan, 
2005) and endorsements (Hillman, 2003; Hillman and Wan, 2005). We obtained 
endorsements from the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre (GIPC) and the Association of 
Ghana Industries (AGI). These endorsees were strategically chosen to give credibility to the 
study, but not affect the results. GIPC, an agency under the Office of the President of Ghana, 
is responsible for promoting private sector development and attracting foreign investment 
into the country. Among its objectives is the creation of an enabling and supportive business 
environment devoid of institutional constraints. AGI is a business and pressure group made 
up of over 1200 small, medium and large scale firms operating in Ghana. AGI advocates for 
favourable business conditions for its members. 
Data was collected from Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), Managing Directors 
(MDs) and other senior managers. The sample consisted of 300 firms selected from the 
membership directory of AGI, the online directory of BusinessGhana and GIPC’s Ghana 
Club 100. Meeting the sampling requirement, all the selected firms operated in Ghana for at 
least three years. This requirement was used because the survey made reference to the past 
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three years (2011 to 2013) as the time frame for responses, a strategy aimed at avoiding 
biased responses based on one-off positive or negative experiences (Mesquita and Lazzarini, 
2008; White et al., 2015). Due to poor postal services in Ghana, the questionnaires and cover 
letters were delivered on-site. After several visits and phone calls, 188 surveys were collected 
from firms operating in 21 industries including mining, oil and gas, pharmaceuticals, 
telecommunications, and manufacturing. Nine surveys were unusable, leaving a final sample 
of 179 and a final response rate of 59.6%. 
Validity and reliability 
We insisted that only senior managers completed the questionnaires. On the average, 
respondents worked at their respective companies for six-and-half years, suggesting that they 
are knowledgeable of their firms. We addressed common method variance (CMV) using 
various methods. First, we were careful with the wording of the questions. Because of the 
dark side of political connections (Doh et al., 2012), firms could be unwilling to disclose their 
political ties. Questions were therefore diligently phrased to reduce social desirability bias. 
Second, we reverse-phrased some of the questions  in order to reduce acquiescence bias 
whereby respondents agree or disagree with statements regardless of content or without 
scrutiny (Winkler, Kanouse, and Ware, 1982). Reverse-phrasing works like a cognitive 
“speed ramp” which requires respondents to be more controlled in their cognitive processing 
(Hinkin, 1995). Third, we delivered two surveys, to be independently completed by two 
different managers, to each sampled firm (Lee and Miller, 1999) in order to control for single 
rater bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Surprisingly, only ten firms returned both questionnaires 
and inter-rater agreements were measured using Cohen’s kappa (Cohen, 1960). The kappa 
statistic for all ten firms was statistically significant, and ranged from .818 to .944, indicating 
that responding managers had a “very good” level of agreement (Altman, 1991). In general, 
the high level of agreement suggests that the remaining data from single respondents is 
19 
 
reliable, as has been shown by other studies (Miller, Cardinal, and Glick, 1997; White et al., 
2015). Even though it was difficult to obtain secondary data, we triangulated some of the 
primary data using information from secondary sources, and we were able to do this for the 
few publicly listed firms in the sample. Fourth, the inclusion of moderation effects in the 
analysis reduced the effect of CMV. According to methodologists, complex interactions are 
likely to be out of respondents’ cognitive maps and are not predicted by CMV (Dooley and 
Fryxell, 1999). Because respondents are not able to guess the interactions that will be tested, 
they are not able to respond in a socially desirable manner. Finally, we performed the 
Harman’s (1967) single factor test which did not indicate the existence of CMV.  
We also tested for non-response bias using the approach of Armstrong and Overton 
(1977) whereby we compared early and late-arriving completed surveys. T-tests revealed no 
significant difference for any key items or variables, thus ruling out the existence of systemic 
non-response bias. Internal consistency was measured for all scales using Cronbach’s alpha. 
A coefficient of 0.70 is typically considered adequate (Nunnally, 1978). All the scales have 
reliability scores above this threshold.  
Following prior studies, we confirmed the factor structure of the constructs by 
performing confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). Additionally, CFA enabled us to derive other 
measures of reliability such as average variance extracted (AVE) and composite reliability 
(CR). As shown in Table 1, the AVE and CR scores exceed the minimum thresholds of 0.50 
and 0.70 respectively (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The high factor loadings support 
convergent validity (Hair et al., 1998). Also, the fit statistics (CFI = 0.95, NFI = 0.96, IFI = 
0.98, RMSEA = 0.05, p > 0.05) show that the measurement model fits the data well. We 
followed the approach of Ambos, Andersson and Birkinshaw (2010) and checked 
discriminant validity by comparing the square root of the AVE with the squared correlation 
between constructs. The AVE values are consistently larger than the correlations between the 
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constructs, indicating that each construct has more internally extracted variance than the 
variance it shares with other constructs (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
                                         ---------------------------------- 
Variables and Measurement 
Independent variables: Following Peng and Luo (2000) and Guo et al. (2014), we 
developed a three-item scale to measure Managerial political ties (α = .94). This three-item 
scale measures the extent to which managers invest resources and time in establishing and 
maintaining relations with politicians. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with (a) investing in building ties with government officials (b) spending time 
dealing with government officials and (c) making efforts to ensure good relations with 
government officials. These were measured on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to 
(7) “strongly agree”. To measure CSR (α = .80), we used the scale developed by Turker 
(2009). This scale comprehensively captures firms’ CSR to society, employees, customers 
and government. Respondents were asked to indicate their level of agreement with the items 
on a scale ranging from (1) “strongly disagree” to (7) “strongly agree”. Our exploratory and 
confirmatory factor analysis revealed three dimensions of CSR (see Table 1), which fit into a 
combined construct/variable. We measured PA function using a dummy, coded 1 and 0 for 
firms with and without PA departments or functions respectively. 
Dependent variable: Drawing on previous studies (Puck et al., 2013; Schwens et al., 
2011) and incorporating insights from The World Bank Enterprise Survey (WBES) and the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) methodology, we developed an 11-item scale for 
measuring Institutional Risk Exposure (α = .75). We asked firms to indicate the extent to 
which certain political, economic and legal factors are obstacles to their operations, on a scale 
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ranging from (1) “minor obstacle” to (7) “major obstacle”. As expected, exploratory factor 
analysis revealed that institutional risk is a three-dimensional construct (see Table 1). 
Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the existence of a single construct for risk; hence the 
three dimensions were combined into an overall institutional risk exposure variable, as was 
done by Puck et al. (2013). 
Control Variables: We controlled for other variables that can impact institutional 
risk exposure. Regulation has been noted as one of the strongest impetus for corporate 
political activity (Hansen and Mitchell, 2000; Mitchell, Hansen, and Jepsen, 1997). Firms in 
highly regulated industries have high stakes in government policy (Lang and Lockhart, 1990), 
and hence are actively involved in politics (Stigler, 1971). This high involvement in politics 
is expected to reduce risk exposure. Following Hadani and Schuler (2013), we also included 
regulation which is defined by a dummy, coded 1 for firms operating in highly regulated 
industries (telecommunications, pharmaceuticals and utilities, etc.). To test the presence of 
the liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995) with respect to institutional risk, we included 
Ownership which was defined by a dummy variable, coded 1 for foreign firms (more than 
50% owned by foreign investors) and 0 for local firms. Older firms, through their acquisition 
of local knowledge and experience, can avoid risks. We therefore included and measured Age 
as the number of years the firm has been operational in Ghana. Institutional shareholders, by 
virtue of their large stakes, have a stronger motivation to help their firms overcome 
institutional constraints. To account for this, we included institutional ownership (α = .94). 
Respondents were asked to indicate the extent to which Pension Funds, Mutual Funds, 
Insurance companies, Charities, and Private Equity Firms hold shares in their companies, 
both as a proportion of total shareholding and on a Likert scale ranging from (1) “very low” 
to (7) “very high”. As large firms have large exposures to the business environment, we 
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controlled for firm size which is operationalized as the logarithm of the number of employees 
(Acquaah, 2007).  
Analysis and Results 
Multiple hierarchical regressions were run to test the hypotheses. Serial correlation was 
checked using the Durbin-Watson statistic (Durbin and Watson, 1951). We also checked 
whether any cases exerted undue influence over the parameters of the Models by analysing 
distances (Cook and Weisberg, 1982). We centred lower-order terms before creating the 
interaction terms (Aiken and West, 1991). There were no problems of multicollinearity (see 
VIFs in Table 2). To further check robustness, we ran the Models using bootstrapped samples 
which revealed that the coefficients are an accurate estimate.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
                                         ---------------------------------- 
The means, standard deviations, VIFs and correlations between the variables are 
reported in Table 2. In Table 3, Model 1 shows the association between the control variables 
and institutional risk exposure. It reveals that institutional holding is negatively associated 
with institutional risk exposure while firm size and regulation are positively associated with 
risk exposure. This suggests that institutional holding reduces risk exposure whereas large 
and highly regulated firms are exposed to higher risk. In Models 2 and 4, the results show 
that CSR is negatively associated with institutional risk exposure (Model 2: β = -0.08, p < 
0.1; Model 4: β = -0.10, p < 0.1). This suggests that firms that are socially responsible 
perceive low risk exposure, hence providing support for H2. In Models 3 and 4, the results 
show that political ties are not significantly associated with risk exposure (Model 3: β = 0.05, 
p > 0.1; Model 4: β = 0.06, p > 0.1), even though the coefficients are positive. These results 
provide no support for H1. The moderating variable, PA, is significantly and negatively 
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related to risk exposure (Model 5: β = -0.47, p < 0.01), indicating the importance of the PA 
function for managing the external environment.  
The moderating effect of CSR on the relationship between MPT and risk exposure is 
insignificant (Model 6: β = 0.04, p > 0.1) and thus warrants no further analysis. We therefore 
found no support for H3. In models 7 and 8, we followed the interpretation of interaction 
terms that have dummy variables as lower-order terms (Hardy, 1993)
2
. The interaction term 
MPT*PA (PA coding reversed) is significant (Model 7: β = -0.18, p < 0.01) and the 
coefficient for MPT is also significant (Model 7: β = 0.10, p < 0.05), indicating that firms 
that are politically connected and have public affairs functions perceive high risk exposure. 
Hence we found no support for H4a. We also did not find evidence to support H4b. While 
CSR*PA is significant (Model 8: β = -0.23, p < 0.05), the co-efficient of CSR is insignificant 
(Model 8: β = -0.03, p > 0.1). In Model 9, the three-way interaction between MPT, CSR and 
PA is insignificant and does not support H4c. In Model 10 however, this three-way 
interaction is significant, but CSR, MPT and MPT*CSR are insignificant, making the result 
uninterpretable.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
                                         ---------------------------------- 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Nonmarket strategy literature is replete with claims that political strategies and CSR reduce 
firms’ exposure to risk (Baysinger, 1984; Hillman and Hitt, 1999). These claims are deeply 
rooted in conceptions that MPT replace inefficient and insufficiently developed market 
supporting institutions (Acquaah, 2007; Peng and Luo, 2000) and enable firms to obtain 
                                                          
2
 When a model contains an interaction term which is the product of a continuous variable and a dummy variable, 
coefficients on the lower-order continuous term are interpreted as the effect of the continuous variable only and only when 
the dummy variable is 0. The results correspond with the group = 0 
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exclusive and first-hand information about policy (Pfeffer, 1972) or gain access to the 
corridors of regulatory power (Hillman, 2005). These claims are also based on evidence that 
CSR enables firms to gain institutional legitimacy (Beddewela and Fairbrass, 2016; Mellahi 
et al., 2016). Unfortunately, we did not find evidence to support the efficacy of MPT in 
institutional risk reduction or the complementarity between MPT and CSR. Essentially, the 
argument that political connections reduce uncertainty is unsupported. However, we found 
evidence to show that CSR reduces risk exposure, most probably through the goodwill and 
legitimacy creates.  
This study makes important contributions to the literature. First, it contributes to the 
nonmarket literature by enhancing our understanding of the effect of MPT and CSR on risk 
exposure. It is worth mentioning that not much empirical work has been done on this topic. 
This study reveals that there is no significant association between political ties and risk 
exposure, and demonstrates that the conjectured ability of CPA to reduce risk might only be 
illusional, not real. It also highlights the role of PA functions in nonmarket strategy, and how 
visibility increases the risk exposure of politically connected firms (Puck et al., 2013). 
Though the findings do not support our hypotheses about the interactive effect of PA 
functions, the significant main effect of PA functions on risk exposure as well as the 
interactive effect of PA functions and MPT suggests the importance of these functions.  In 
essence, this study shows that while institutional legitimacy leads to lower risk, it also places 
firms under scrutiny which adversely affects perceptions of risk exposure. 
Second, this study is among early studies to empirically examine the complementarity 
between CPA and CSR, and hence fills the lack of insight into this interesting topic. CPA and 
CSR have been treated as silos which hardly interact (Mellahi et al., 2016), but recent work 
has posited that they can be integrated for high firm performance (Hond et al., 2014; Liedong 
et al., 2015). For instance, some scholars have suggested that CSR reduces barriers to 
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political entry (Wang and Qian, 2011) and weakens the negative effect of CPA (Liedong et 
al., 2015; Sun et al., 2012). In spite of these positive arguments, we did not find evidence to 
support complementariness. The findings show that while CSR reduces perceptions of risk 
exposure, it is ineffective when combined with MPT, thereby suggesting the existence of 
“cannibalization” whereby MPT erode the gains of CSR. This study demonstrates that in 
institutionally voided environments such as Ghana, a proper alignment is required to realize 
the gains of CPA and CSR; otherwise value-erosion will occur (Hond et al., 2014).  
In shedding more light on the contributions of our study, we draw greater attention to 
the fact that institutional risk in emerging countries is mostly policy oriented. We argue that 
political strategies with a strong focus on institutional entrepreneurship (Dacin, Goodstein, 
and Scott, 2002; DiMaggio, 1988) will be more effective for the creation of new institutions 
or the transformation of existing institutions, and hence will be more suitable to reduce 
institutional risk exposure. Such political strategies are informational in form and could 
include lobbying and petitioning. Unfortunately, lobbying and petitioning have limited scope 
and application in emerging countries where the structures for private sector participation in 
policymaking are lacking (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Rather, relational strategies such as 
MPT are predominant. Though political ties can facilitate access to the polity, they may not 
be effective for addressing institutional voids. In essence, political access is not the same as 
political influence (Kim, 2008; Liedong et al., 2015). We argue that more is required, beyond 
access, to instigate institutional entrepreneurship. MPT may not be useful for buffering 
against investment climate constraints because managers fail to further exploit their access to 
the polity.  
Additionally, MPT are more likely to offer idiosyncratic benefits which cannot be 
assured or guaranteed in the future. As institutional voids become entrenched and political 
ties are ineffective for institutional entrepreneurship, firms may only use their ties to 
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overcome or avoid institutional voids every time they are encountered, but the voids will 
remain and recur in the future. Consequently, all recurring voids will present new 
predicaments in which firms have chances of both success and failure. In effect, firms survive 
by the day. Such surviving-by-the-day mentality of managers could account for the 
insignificant association between MPT and institutional risk exposure. Moreover, political 
strategies are largely targeted at government officials and are therefore less effective for 
engaging with other stakeholders who can influence business environments. This argument 
may create the impression that combining MPT with CSR - which addresses non-political 
stakeholders - will significantly reduce risk exposure. Yet, the attempt to establish an 
integrated nonmarket strategy for risk reduction failed as no significant interaction between 
CSR and MPT was found. Hence an argument of complementarity cannot be supported. The 
singular significant effect of CSR on risk reduction did not bear on the interaction of MPT 
and CSR, highlighting a possible trade-off from combining CSR and CPA (Liedong et al., 
2015). Put differently, when the results for CSR (negative and significant relationship with 
risk exposure), MPT (positive and insignificant relationship with risk exposure) and 
MPT*CSR (positive and insignificant relationship with risk exposure) are examined and 
interpreted together, they show that the significant effect of CSR is “cannibalized” by MPT 
when both are combined. Hence, instead of a complementary effect between CSR and MPT, 
the findings suggest a possible substitution effect. In this regard, the positive perceptions 
associated with CSR become tainted by the insecurity of political ties.  
The MPT*PA result is very surprising, but explicable. PA functions increase the 
visibility of firms. Visibility can increase transparency and legitimacy and reduce risk 
exposure as this study shows, but it can also expose firms to the scrutiny of stakeholders and 
thus increases risk exposure (Meznar and Nigh, 1995; Puck et al., 2013). CPA has a dark side 
i.e. bribery, corruption, etc. (Doh et al., 2012; Lawton et al., 2013a), hence public perception 
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of MPT is not always positive and most managers in emerging countries seem to know this. 
Once public resentment builds, politicians lose their discretion to favour firms (Schuler, 
2008) and policy change becomes likely. Therefore, perceptions of risk exposure will 
increase when politically connected firms become visible to many stakeholders through their 
PA activities. In this respect, PA actions used to improve institutional legitimacy may 
eventually place firms’ political activities under perusal. Moreover, the overwhelming power 
of politicians in emerging countries may lure managers into thinking that developing ties with 
politicians is the ultimate tactic. Such thinking could lead to less dedication towards PA 
activities which seem to be more effective in institutional risk reduction. On the flipside, the 
visibility PA activities give to CSR does not increase risk exposure. In fact, the direction of 
the CSR*PA result is negative, as expected, but only insignificant. Our findings therefore 
highlight the different effect of visibility on both CSR and MPT. Essentially, visibility of 
MPT has negative consequences for outcomes in weak institutional environments.  
Besides theoretical contributions, this study has practical implications for managers. 
First, the findings challenge the efficacy of political ties in emerging countries, and suggest 
that managers who want to overcome the entrenched barriers and constraints in 
institutionally-voided countries should employ strategies that promote institutional 
entrepreneurship. In essence, political ties alone are not enough. Firms need to use 
informational strategies such as lobbying or petitioning as they are more effective for policy 
and regulatory influence (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Though the policy-making process in 
most emerging countries does not offer many opportunities for firms to be involved, firms 
must enhance their capabilities to comment on policy issues using petitions and press 
conferences. Second, CSR seems to have a much stronger effect on risk exposure; hence 
managers should implement CSR initiatives to improve legitimacy and gain the trust of 
institutional actors. In most emerging countries, CSR is a moral obligation (Kuada and 
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Hinson, 2012), and is therefore highly appreciated. Third, for firms that do both CPA and 
CSR, there seems to be an eroding effect of the former on the latter. A careful alignment 
between CPA, CSR and PA is necessary to derive or preserve value from nonmarket strategy.  
Limitations and future Research  
Although this study presents findings that advance knowledge of nonmarket strategy, it is 
subject to some limitations. First, as typical with survey research, this study uses cross-
sectional data which makes the analyses susceptible to endogeneity. However, we followed 
previous studies and used a three-year framing for the responses in order to reduce the threat 
of reverse causality. In the analyses, the absence of autocorrelation of the residual errors also 
reduced the threat of endogeneity. However, endogeneity from other sources such as 
measurement errors and omitted variables could still affect the results. The findings must 
therefore be interpreted with caution. Second, this study focuses on a single political strategy 
– MPT. It is possible that other strategies, such as campaign contributions and lobbying, will 
have different effects. Third, the results are context-specific. Though Ghana shares similar 
characteristics with other emerging countries, there are unique institutional and contextual 
elements across different emerging countries. As a result, caution is required when 
generalizing the findings and conclusions to other developing countries in or out of sub-
Saharan Africa. 
 The afore-mentioned limitations, in addition to the counterintuitive results, open up 
interesting avenues for future research. First, it would be insightful for future studies to 
investigate the political strategy-institutional risk link using different political tactics and 
employing longitudinal or panel designs which rigorously address reverse causality and 
endogeneity.  Additionally, future studies could focus on comparative analyses among 
emerging countries to make the findings generalizable. At the micro-level, future studies 
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could explore how managers perceive institutional risk and how their perceptions trigger 
nonmarket strategic actions. 
Second, the inclusion of PA has revealed interesting insights and we encourage future 
nonmarket strategy studies to further explore this function. Additionally, the way we measure 
PA leaves room for further investigation. A distinction must be made between having a PA 
function and performing PA functions. The efficacy of a PA, to a large extent, depends on its 
size and resource endowments (Lawton, Rajwani and Doh, 2013b). In reality, firms may have 
PAs in their structures, but the PAs may not be functional or effective. We therefore 
encourage future studies to measure PA using a scale and not a dummy. If objective data is 
available, it will be better to measure this variable using the number of PA employees or the 
budgetary allocations for PA functions.  
Finally, the evidence herein does not support complementarity between CPA and 
CSR. As research on the combinative effects of CPA and CSR is increasing (Mellahi et al., 
2016), this study calls on researchers to look beyond the positive effects of combining CPA 
and CSR. In this respect, future research should examine whether there is cannibalization or 
substitution, rather than complementarity, between the two activities. Does CSR or CPA 
erode the gains of the other? Does the alignment of CSR and CPA matter for realizing any 
gains from their combination? Are CPA and CSR complements or substitutes? These 
questions should be the focus of future research agenda. In sum, this study provides fine-
grained insights into the singular and combined effects of political and social strategies and 
thus enhances our understanding of integrated nonmarket strategy.   
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Figure 1: Research Model 
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Table 1: Constructs, Measurement Items, Reliability and Validity 
Construct Measurement Items SFL T-value 
Managerial political ties  
  (AVE = 0.84; CR = 0.94) Spending time dealing with government affairs 0.93 19.91 
 
Investing in building relationships with government officials 0.91 (Fixed) 
 
Maintaining good relationships with government officials 0.91 18.99 
Institutional Risk - Regulation 
  (AVE = 0.73; CR = 0.94) Obstacles posed by licensing and permit requirements 0.93 16.54 
 
Obstacles posed by labour regulations 0.9 15.66 
 
Obstacles posed by customs and trade regulations 0.87 14.85 
 
Obstacles posed by judicial system 0.83 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by tax regulations 0.81 13.25 
Institutional Risk - Administrative 
  (AVE = 0.60; CR = 0.88) Obstacles posed by corruption and bribery 0.82 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by bureaucracy or red tape 0.77 8.04 
 
Obstacles posed by contract repudiation 
0.65 7.58 
Institutional Risk - Controls 
  (AVE = 0.61; CR = 0.90) Obstacles posed by import and export controls 0.96 (Fixed) 
 
Obstacles posed by currency controls 0.76 9.58 
 
Obstacles posed by price controls 0.65 8.46 
Institutional Holding  
  (AVE = 0.75; CR = 0.95) Shares held by Pension funds 0.94 (Fixed) 
 
Shares held by Insurance companies 0.92 22.73 
 
Shares held by Endowment funds 0.88 20.09 
 
Shares held by Mutual funds 0.86 18.76 
 
Shares held by Charities 0.81 15.93 
 Shares held by Private equity firms 0.77 14.44 
CSR to Society 
   (AVE = 0.70; CR = 0.87) Our company does participates in activities which aim to protect and 
improve the quality of the natural environment 0.89 (Fixed) 
 
Our company makes investment to create a better life for future 
generations 0.85 18.54 
 
Our company implements special programs to minimize its negative 
impact on the natural environment. 0.83 16.27 
 
Our company targets sustainable growth which considers future 
generations. 0.82 13.89 
 
Our company supports nongovernmental organizations working in 
problematic areas. 0.78 12.73 
 
Our company contributes to campaigns and projects that promote the well-
being of the society 0.77 11.64 
 
Our company encourages its employees to participate in voluntarily 
activities 0.74 10.82 
 
Our company emphasizes the importance of its social responsibilities to 
the society 0.71 9.98 
CSR to Employees 
   (AVE = 0.68; CR = 0.89) Our company policies encourage the employees to develop their skills and 
careers 0.86 (Fixed) 
 
The management of our company is concerned with employees’ needs and 
wants 0.83 19.21 
 
Our company implements flexible policies to provide a good work & life 
balance for its employees 0.78 18.36 
 
Managerial decisions regarding the employees are usually fair 0.72 17.11 
 
Our company supports employees who want to acquire additional 
education 0.69 15.48 
CSR to Customers & Government 
  (AVE = 0.62; CR = 0.88) Our company respects consumer rights beyond the legal requirements 0.87 (Fixed) 
 
Our company provides full and accurate information about its products to 
its customers 0.84 20.02 
 
Customer satisfaction is highly important for our company 0.76 18.31 
 
Our company does pays its taxes on a regular and continuing basis 0.69 14.25 
 
Our company complies with legal regulations completely and promptly 0.65 10.08 
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Table 2: Descriptives and Correlations 
 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Highest 
VIF 
1 Institutional Risk 2.92 0.97 - 
        
 2 
Managerial Political 
Ties  
3.90 2.19 0.16** - 
       1.27 
3 Social Responsibility  4.99 1.37 0.03 0.19** - 
      1.29 
4 Public Affairs  0.62 0.49 -0.19** -0.09 -0.11 - 
     1.32 
5 Regulation  0.42 0.49 0.23*** 0.09 0.12 0.08 - 
    1.07 
6 Institutional Holding 2.08 1.51 -0.19*** 0.06 -0.23*** 0.28*** -0.07 - 
   1.21 
7 Firm Age 19.17 17.1 0.06 0.36*** 0.01 0.26*** -0.05 0.27*** - 
  1.40 
8 Firm Size 4.56 0.91 0.14* 0.12* 0.10 0.33*** 0.06 0.11 0.26*** - 
 1.20 
9 Ownership 0.45 0.50 -0.11 -0.05 -0.37*** 0.15** -0.17** 0.13* 0.19** 0.03 - 1.25 
 
*** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (Two-tailed significance tests) 
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Table 3: Regression Results 
Variables Institutional Risk Exposure 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Control Variables             
    
Institutional Holding -0.14*** -0.16** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.13** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.13** -0.12** -0.13*** 
Firm Age 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01** 
Firm Size 0.13* 0.15 0.13 0.15* 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.20** 0.22*** 0.20** 0.17** 
Ownership -0.15 -0.24 -0.13 -0.22 -0.19 -0.17 -0.16 -0.26 -0.19 -0.19 
Regulation  0.41*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 0.40*** 0.46*** 0.48*** 0.43*** 0.44*** 0.43*** 0.37*** 
Predictor Variables             
    
Social Responsibility (CSR)   -0.08*   -0.10* -0.11* -0.06 -0.08 -0.03 -0.11* 0.15 
Managerial Political Ties (MPT)     0.05 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.10** 0.05 0.04 0.06 
Contingency Variable         
 
  
    
Public Affairs (PA)         -0.49*** -0.47*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.51*** -0.52*** 
Interactions             
    
MPT*CSR           0.04 
   
0.12 
MPT*PA 
  
        -0.18*** 
  
-0.11 
CSR*PA 
    
    
 
-0.23*** 
 
-0.34*** 
MPT*CSR*PA 
    
    
  
-0.04 -0.15*** 
Model Stats 
    
    
    
Adjusted R2 0.1 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.24 
Model F 4.89*** 4.86*** 4.44*** 4.28*** 5.10*** 4.80*** 5.53*** 5.11*** 4.61*** 5.68*** 
 
N = 179. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1 (two-tailed significance tests) 
